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This paper is concerned with the conditions under which asset prices in an 
intertemporal competitive equilibrium are equal to the present value oí the streams 
oí future dividends to which each' asset represents a c1aim. According to a central 
result of the theory of finance, this is always true in the case of finite-horizon 
economies, as long as there are no restrictions upon transactions other than that 
associated with possible incompleteness of the set of securities that are traded. 
(The result is sometimes called "the fundamental theorem of asset pricing" .) Here' 
we consider the extent to which such a result continues to be valid in the case of 
trading over an infinite horizon. 
It has often been observed in the econometric literature on "asset pricing 
bubbles" that it is possible, in principIe, for the price of a perpetuity and the 
dividends on that security to satisfy at a11 times a present-value relation for one­
period holding returns, while the security's price nonetheless does not equal the 
present value of the stream of dividends expected over the infinite future. In such 
a case, the price of the perpetuity is said to involve a bubble component.1 Joint 
stochastic processes for which this component is non-zero are sometimes argued to 
characterize existing assets; fol' a recent example, see Froot and Obstfeld (1991). 
But such an inference depends u¡)on aspects of the stochastic processes that are 
inherently difficult to determine with finite data samples. Hence, c1arification of 
the conditions under' which sueh phenomena are theoretica11y possible is likely to 
play an important role in judgements about whether they are observed. 
It has been known since the work of Scheinlanan (1977, 1988) and Brock 
(1979, 1982) that at least in certain simple kinds of infinite-horizon economies, 
involving tl'ading by at most a finite number of infinitely lived households, asset 
pricing bubbles are not possible in an intertemporal equilibrium. The argument 
is, essentia11y, that the existence of a bubble would require asymptotic growth in 
the value of the asset in question, and hence asymptotic growth of the wealth oí 
at least one of the households, at arate inconsistent with optimization by that 
household. Here we seek to extend this result to a much more general class of 
intertemporal equilibrium models. In particular, we wish to consider the issue in 
a framework general enough to include such possibilities as the kind of economies 
treated by Scheinkman and Brock, while a1so inc1uding types of economies known 
to a110w bubbles as an equilibrium phenomenon under at 1east certain circum­
stances, such as the overlapping generations mode1 treated by Tiro1e (1985) 01' 
the type of monetary economy considered by Bew1ey (1980). 
lFor expositions of this familiar idea, see, e.g., Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Chapo 5), or 
Broze and Szafarz (1991, Seco 2.3.4). 
Our framework for analysis is an intertemporal general equilibriurn model 
involving spot markets for goods.and securities at each of a countably infinite 
sequence of dates. Thus we depart from the methods of analysis of much of the 
literature on intertemporal general equilibriurn theory, which assurnes that all 
dated and contingent future goods are traded for one another in a single market. 
This is because the phenomenon that we wish to consider is only a possibility 
if a security's exchange can always conceivably be due to its expected exchange 
value in another market in the future, rather than having solely to depend upon 
the value of the future goods to which it represents a c1aim.2 We also allow for 
potentially incomplete securities markets, that is, for cases where there are not 
even sequentially complete markets in the sense introduced by Arrow. This com­
plicates the definition of the "fundamental value" of an asset; it also allows for 
bubbles in additional types of cases. Likewise, we allow for incomplete participa­
tion of households in the entire sequence of spot markets, so that our framework 
can treat standard overlapping generations models. Fina11y, we a110w for a reason­
ably general specification of borrowing constraints, to encompass in our analysis 
both the kinds of models with infinitely lived households previously considered by 
Scheinkman and Brock on the one hand, and those considered by Bewley on the 
other.3 
Our intertemporal equilibrium framework is described in Section 1. In Section 
2, we then diseuss the meaning of the "fundamental value" of a security, and 
hence v:hat it means for there to exist a "pricing bubble". Here we reeonstruct, in 
our framework, certain aspects of the Kreps (1981) theory of the extent to which 
arbitrary dividend streams can be priced, given price processes for certain traded 
securities, simply from consideration of the prices consistent with non-existence 
of opportunities for pure arbitrage profits. The existence of an infinite horizon 
2The meaning that we attach to the term "bubble" is thus different from the senses in which 
this term is used by Gilles and LeRo}' (1992, 1993). For us, a "pricing bubble" exists when the 
price of an asset differs from the value (in a sense to be c1arified in Section 2) of the stream of 
dividends to which it is a c1aim. Thus it is neither a property of the valuation operator for such 
dividend streams, nor a property of the dividend streams; and indeed, when pricing bubbles 
are possible in our framework, it is possible in equilibrium for two securities representing c1aims 
to identical dividend streams to have different market prices. (See Tirole, 1985, and Example 
4.1 below.) The relation that may exist between the conditions that exclude "bubbles" in the 
Gilles-LeRoy senses and those that exc1ude bubbles in our sense remains an open question. 
3Kocherlakota (1992) emphasizes the role of the different types of borrowing constraints in 
accounting for the difference between the possibilities of speculative bubbles in the two types of 
models. His analysis, however, is concerned with necessary conditions for the existence of asset 
pricing bubbles, and applies only to economies with no uncertainty. 
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requires fundamental modification of that theory¡ for example, it is no longer 
true, simply because a market price exists for a security giving rise to exactIy a 
dividend strearn, that the dividend strearn must be assigned that price. 
These developments of arbitrage theory over an infinite horizon are the basic 
tools of our analysis in Seetion 3: In this section, we establish our main results 
regarding non-existence of pricing bubbles in an equilibrium. with the property 
that the economy's aggregate endowrnent has a finite value. These results are 
discussed further in Section 4, through the presentation of examples that illustrate 
the need for various of our assumptions. While several cases are analyzed in which 
equilibrium pricing bubbles are possible, our general results imply that these 
examples, including the well-known examples of monetary equilibria mentioned 
earlier, hold only under rather special circumstances. Section 5 concludes. 
1. The Model 
\Ve consider an infinite-horizon economy with homogeneous information and se­
quential trading. Trading occurs at each information set (or node) in the infor­
mation structure N. Each information set in N is dated with one of the discrete 
sequence of dates t = 0,1,2.... We use the notation st to denote one of the 
information sets that may be reached at date t. Each information set st has a 
unique irnmediate predecessor, which we will denote st - 1, that is dated t - 1. 
There is a unique initial information set so, the only one dated O. Each node has 
a finite number of irnmediate successors. We use the notation sTlst to indicate 
that the node ST belongs to the subtree whose root is st, Le., that ei ther ST = Si 
01' Si is a predecessor of STo 
At each node st E N, there exist spot markets for n(st) consumption goods and 
k (Si) securities, where both of these are finite numbers. The set of households 
which are able to trade in the markets at node st is denoted by H(st); this 
is a subset of the countable set of households H that make up the economy. 
"Ve allow for the possibility of incomplete participation at sorne nodes so that 
we can treat cases such as overlapping generations models. Let N h denote the 
subset of N consisting of nodes at which household h can trade, for any household 
hE H¡ st E Nh if and only if hE H(st). Then a household is infinitely litled if for 
any date T, there exists sorne st E N h with t ~ T¡ otherwise, the household is 
finitely litled. 
We make the following assumptions about market participation. For each 
h E H, let Ñh e N h denote the (possibly empty) subset of N h consisting of 
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terminal nodes for h, Le., nodes after which h no longer trades. (To be precise, 
st E Ñh means that if sTlst for some T > t, then ST rt Nh.) We then assume: 
(ii) for each st E N, there exists at least one h EH for which st E Nh\Ñh. 
Assumption (i) states that a household that trades at st either trades at none 
of the successors of st (if it is a terminal node for that household), or trades at a11 
of the irnmediate successors of st (if it is not a terminal node). This eliminates 
ambiguity about the type of securities that households can trade with one another 
at a given node. Assumption (ii) guarantees that the entire economy is connected. 
The securities that are traded are defined by a current vector of prices, q(st), 
and the returns they promise to deliver at future information sets. These returns 
are specified by an n(st) x k(st :- 1) matrix d(st), and a k(st) x k(st - 1) matrix 
b(st), defined for each node st with t > O. A household that chooses to hold a 
portfolio Z E 'R,k(st-l) at the end of trading at node st - 1 then obtains a vector 
of goods dividends d(st)z and a vector of securities b(st)z if information set st 
is reached. This a110ws us to treat general multi-period securities. Among other 
cases, we may consider trading in fiat money, a security m such that 
dim (st) - Ofor a11 i, a11 st 
bjm (st) - Ofor a11 j ::j: m, a11 st 
bmm(st) = 1 for a11 st 
\Ve may also consider bonds that promise future payments of money, if money 
itself is one of the traded securities. 
\Ve also assume that there is free disposal of every security that is purchased. 
In order for this assumption to make sense in general circumstances, we require 
that at each st E N with t > O, d(st), b(st) ~ O. Thus the stream of dividends to 
which any security represents a claim is non-negative in a11 goods at a11 information 
sets, and the future securities to which any security represents a claim are also a 
non-negative vector (with, accordingly, a non-negative market value). Note that, 
given the possibility of short sale of securities, these stipulations do not imply any 
restriction upon the nature of the linear space of income transfers between spot 
markets that may be attainable using marketed securities. 
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Each household h E H(sO) enters the spot markets at SO with an initial en­
dowment of securities Zh(SO). The net supply of securities at each node st,z(st), 
can then be defined recursively as 
z(so). - L Zh(SO) 
heH(sO) 
Z(st) _ b(st)z(st - 1) 
In the case that H(sO) is an infinite set, we require that initial securities endow­
ments be such that the sum in the first line is well-defined (and finite). There is 
then a we11-defined and finite net supply of securities in a11 periods. We assume 
that z(SO) ~ O, though individual households may have negative initial endow­
ments. This implies that z(st) ~ Oat a11 nodes, so that all securities are in either 
zero or positive net supply. 
We can now determine the stream of future dividends associated with any 
given security. For a11 srlst with r ~ t, let the k(sr) x k(st) matrix e(srlst) be 
defined recursively as 
e(stlst) - h(st)
 
e(srli) = b(sr)e(sr -lli), for a11 srlst,r > t
 
\Ve may then say that the portfolio z of securities held at the end of trading at 
node st represents a claim to a stream of dividends, namely, the vector x(srlst)z 
for goods at each node sr 1st with r > t. 
A security j traded at st is of finite maturity if there exists a date T such 
that eij(Sr¡st) = O for a11 i, a11 srlst with r ~ T. Otherwise, the security is of 
infinite maturity. Fiat moneYl defined aboye, is an example of a security of infinite 
maturity, even though dim(st) = Ofor a11 i and a11 sto 
At each node st E Nh 1 each household h E H (st) has an endowment of con­
sumption goods wh(st) E 'R:(st>. We furthermore suppose that the economy has 
a we11-defined (and finite) aggregate endowment 
w(st) =: L wh(st) ~ O 
hEH(st) 
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at each node st. Considering the goods that are real dividends on securities in 
positive net supply, the economy's aggregate goods supply is then given by 
w(st) =w(st) +d(i)z(st - 1) ~ O 
(In this definition, the final term lS zero if t = O.) 
Each household is assumed to have preferences represented by an ordering t h , 
defined on its consumption set 
X h = rr 'R:<") 
,'eN" 
That is, it is defined for a11 consumpti911 plans involving non-negative consumption 
goods at each node st E N h • For simplicity, the consumption set extends ayer 
a11 goods in the information set where an agent can trade. This hypothesis can. 
be weakened to aIlow for more general 01' a1ternative settings. It is nonetheless 
essential for our results that consumption sets be boimded below so as to place an 
upper bound on the total amount of goods that can be sold at a given information 
seto 
We make the fol1owing monotonicity assumption regarding preferences: 
(A.l) For each hE H, the relation t h is non-decreasing on X h , and strictly 
increasing in the consumption of sorne good traded at each node st E Nh. 
Our results are strengthened if \Ve postulate a further joint assumption on prefer­
ences and endowments, implying a sufficient degree of impatience. For any vector 
eh E X h and any node st E N h, we can write eh = (c~ (st), eh(st), ei(sf)), where 
e~ denotes the coordinates of eh indicating consumption at nodes other than the 
subtree of nodes sT E Nh such that sT 1st, and ei(st) denotes those indicating 
consumption at nodes sT E N h such that ST I st and T > t. Then for sorne results 
\Ve also require: 
(A.2) For each hE H, there exists 0:5 ,h < 1 such that for any st E N h , 
(e~ (st), ch(st) + w(st), ,e~(st)) ~h eh 
for a11 consumption plans satisfying ch(ST) :5 W(sT) at each ST E N h, and aH 
'Y ~ 1,h. 
Here ~h denotes strict preference. Note that the consumption plans referred 
to include a11 those that are associated with feasible allocations of resources. Also 
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note that ')'h may be different for each h E H, and that we do not require that 
the col1eetion {')'h} is bounded away from 1. This kind of uniform impatienee is 
also assumed by Levine and Zame (1994) and Magill and Quinzii (1994). In the 
case of finitely lived households, (A.2) must hold if preferenees are deseribed by 
any eontinuous utility funetion, and is thus innocuous in that case. In the case of 
infinitely lived households, the assumption is less trivial, though it is satisfied in 
the case of any continuous, stationary, recursive utility functión that discounts the 
future (see Santos and Woodford, 1993, Seco 6, for a precise statement), and thus 
in many familiar models. Example 4.5 below considers a (product continuous) 
preference ordering for an infinitely lived household that does not satisfy (A.2). 
Household h chooses, at each node st E N h , an n(st)-vector of consumption 
goods ch(s'), and a k(st)-vector of securities Zh(st) to hold at the end of trading, 
subject to the budget eonstraints 
p(i)'ch(st) + q(l)'Zh(st) < p(st)'Wh(st).+ R(st)'Zh(st - 1) (1.1a)
 
ch(st) > O (1.1b)
 
q(i)'Zh (st) > _Bh(st) (1.1e)
 
Here, p(st) denotes the n(st )-vector of goods prices in the spot market at node st, 
q(s') denotes the k(st)-veetor of seeurities prices, and 
denotes the k(st - 1)-veetor oí one-period returns if node st is reaehed, for eaeh 
of the seeurities that eould have been held at the end oí trading at the immediate 
predeeessor node. 
Condition (1.1a) is just the standard Arrow-Radner budget constraint for an 
eeonomy with sequential trading. If t > O, but household h does not trade at 
st - 1, (1.1a) has the same form, but with Zh(st - 1) = O. If t = O, (1.1a) takes 
the speeial form 
(1.1aa) 
Condition (1.1b) restates again the lower bound on the eonsumption seto Con­
dition (l.lc) specifies a limit on the extent to whieh household h can finanee 
consumption at node st by borrowing. The quantity B h (st) indicates a household 
specific borrowing limit at node st, assumed to be non-negative. We may suppose 
in general that the borrowing limit depends upon equilibrium pricesj examples of 
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such dependence are discussed in Section 4. But because we are not concerned 
here with issues related to the existence or uniqueness of equilibrium, or how an 
equilibrium changes when sorne parameters of the economy are perturbed, we do 
not need to model explicitly the ~ependence of Bh upon (p, q).4 In the charac­
terization of equilibrium that we give here, we simply suppose that household h 
takes the sequence of borrowing limits {Bh(st)} as given, just as it takes the prices 
as given, and our only general assumption regarding the nature of the borrowing 
limits is that Bh(st) ~ Ofor each household h at each node st and that Bh(st) =O 
for st E Ñh. 
If the matrix V(st), which has one row corresponding to R(St+l)' for each 
of the nodes St+l 1st., has a rank equal to the number of rows (the number of 
irmnediate successor nodes), we say that there exist complete markets at node sto 
If not, securities markets are incomplete. Complete markets obviously requires 
that the number of securities traded at st be at least as large as the number 
of immediate successor nodes. In general, complete markets is a property of a 
particular equilibrium, rather than that of the specification of the economy. 
Let an economy with sequential trading be specified by an information struc­
ture N, a set of households H, the participation sets {Nh }, the securities processes 
{b(st),d(st)}, the initial securities endowments {Zh}, the endowment processes 
{wh(st)}, the preferences ~h over consumption sets X h, and the functions defin­
ing the borrowing limits {Bh(st)}, given price processes {p(st), q(st)}. Then the 
processes {p(st), q(st), ch(st), Zh(st)} describe an Arrow-Radner equilibrium if 
(i) for each h E H, the processes {ch(st),Zh(st)} are optimal under the pref­
erences t,h. subject to budget constraints (1.1) being satisfied at each st E N h, 
given prices {p(st),q(st)} and the borrowing limits {Bh(st)} resulting from them; 
(ii) for each Si E N, 
(1.2) 
and 
4See Hernández and Santos (1994), Levine and Zame (1994), and Magill and QUillZii (1994) 
for treatments of existence of equilibrium in infinite-horizon economies with incomplete markets 
and borrowing limits. The existence of an equilibrium generally requires further assumptions on 
preferences. endowments and borrowing Iimits. Such assumptions are not needed for our results 
on the pricillg of securities in a given equilibrium. 
8 
- ------------~-
(iii) for each st EN, 
¿o c"(st) ~ Ü1(St) (1.3a) 
hEH(,t) 
¿ Zh(st) ~ z(st) (1.3b) 
hEH(,t) 
Here, (1.2) is an equilibrium requirement as a result of free disposal; including 
such stipulation as part of the definition of equilibrium avoids introducing further 
modelization for the possibility of disposal of securities. Observe that the suro in 
(1.3a) is necessarily well-defined (as consumption must be non-negative for each 
household), so that we can say unambiguously whether the equality is satisfied. 
The same is not true oí the sum in (1.3b). None~heless, we take it to be part 
of the definition of equilibrium that if H(st) is an infinite set then the portfolios 
chosen are such that the aggregate portfolio demand is well defined. Then, under 
the present assumptions, (1.3a)-(1.3b) must hold with equality for those goods 
and securities with positive prices. 
In the sequel we shall only consider equilibria in which every st in N has the 
property that R(st+l 1st ) :1= O for some st+l 1st ; that is, in which there exists 
some way of carrying wealth into sorne successor. This avoids discussion of a 
number of technicalities (taken up in Santos and Woodford, 1993). In particular, 
it eliminates the possibility of a particular kind of pricing bubble that can in any 
event occur only under quite pathological circumstances. In the absence of other 
comment, we will always understand "equilibrium" to refer to one of this kind. 
2. Pricing by Arbitrage and the Value of a Dividend Stream 
This section provides a complete characterization of the possible valuations of 
an arbitrary income stream of wealth in our infinite horizon framework under 
conditions oí no arbitrage. Then attention is focused on the relation that must 
exist between the price of a security and the value of the stream dividends to which 
it represents a c1aim, and on certain assumptions that guarantee the existence of 
a finite-valued aggregate wealth. As a step toward this end, we first derive certain 
basic properties concerning prices and one-period returns of different securities if 
there are to be no pure arbitrage profits available. 
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Given the price processes (p, q), we say that no arbitrage opportunities exist 
at node st if there is no Z E Rk(,t) satisfying the conditions 
R(SHl)'Z ~ Oforall i+1 Il 
q(i)'~ :s; O 
with at least one strict inequality. 
As is well known from the theory of finite-horizon Arrow-Radner equilibria, 
this is necessarily true at any node st E N in any equilibrium if there are no 
borrowing limits at that node. We now observe that the presence of borrowing 
limits (1.1c) d~es not change this result, at least in the case of equilibria in which 
R(st+1Ist) > Ofor sorne st+1Ist; for in such case one likewise shows that a given 
household could obtain an arbitrary amount of wealth in at least one state without 
committing further expenditure in the remaining nodes. 
As is familiar from the finite-horizon theory, the non-existence of arbitrage 
opportunities at node st implies the existence of a set of state prices a(st) > O 
and {a(st+l)} with a(st+l) > Ofor all st+1Ist, such that 
a(st)q(i)"= L a(i+ 1 )R(i+1)' (2.1 ) 
,1+11" 
This well-kno\\'n result is a consequence of the Minkowski-Farkas lemma (see, 
e.g., Duffie, 1988, p.71). It should be obvious that only the ratios a(s'+l)/a(st) 
are restricted by (2.1); hence the existence result for each node st individually 
allows us to define sorne state-price process {a(st)} for the entire information 
structure such that (2.1) holds. We use A(st) to denote the set of such processes 
for the subtree wi th root st. In the case that there are complete markets at st. 
(2.1) uniquely determines the ratios a(st+l)/a(st) for each st+1Ist, while if there 
are incomplete markets, there are not sufficient number of linearly independent 
conditions in (2.1) to uniquely determine them. 
Such a set of state prices provides an obvious way of evaluating a future stream 
of consumption goods. For any non-negative stream of resources {x(st)}, specify­
ing an n(st)-vector of consumption goods x(st) 2: Oat each node st E N, any pos­
itive goods price process {p(st)}, and any positive state-price process a E A(st), 
one can define the present value at st of the subsequent resource stream, with 
respect to this particular state-price process, as 
v;r(st jp,a) == _(1t) f: L a(sT)p(sT)'x(sT) 
a s T=t+l,TI,t 
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1l::e(st) =SUp _q(st)'Z(st) 
where the suprernum is over a11 plans {z(s')} for the nodes s'lst,r ~ t, such that 
(i) the plan {z(s')} satisfies . 
p(s')'x(s') + R(s')'z(s' -1) ~ 
for a11 s' 1st , r > ti and 
q(s')'z(s') (2.5) 
(ii) there exists a date T such that q(s')'z(s') ~ Ofor a11 s'\st with r ~ T. 
In other words, 1L:e(st) represents the least upper bound for the arnount that 
can be borrowed at node st by a household whose endowment is {x(s')} at a11 
subsequent nodes, if the borrowing lirnits (l.lc) are ignored, but the household 
rnust hold non-negative ",ealth at a11 nodes after sorne finite date. This is a way 
of assigning a lower bound to the present value, at node st, of a clairn to dividends 
{x(s')} at a11 subsequent nodes. 
Similar!y, at node st we may 'define 
1r:r(st) = inf q(st)'z(st) 
where the infimum is over a11 plans {z( s')} for the nodes s' 1st , r ~ t, such that 
(2.6a) 
(2.6b) 
for a11 s'¡st, r > t. Essentially, 1r:r(st) represents a greatest lower bound for the 
amount of wealth needed at node st in order to be able to purchase a consurnption 
stream equal to the process {x( s')} at all subsequent nodes, if the household must 
hold non-negative wealth at a11 nodes from st onward. 
These bounds represent a lower and an upper bound, respectively, fol' the 
present value of the non-negative stream of resources {X(S')}.5 This is shown by 
the fo11owing basic resulto 
liOur definitiollS of these bOUllds, as well as the characterization in Proposition 2.2, are in the 
spirit of those in Kreps (1981), although we cannot directly apply Kreps' results, due to certain 
differences in our set-up, such as our restriction of the consumption set to the non-negative 
orthant. 
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We can correspondingly define the vector of asset pricing bubbles as 
u(st) =q(st) _¡(st) 
for any a E A(st) for securities tr.aded at st. It fo11ows from the proposition that 
this vector is we11-defined and necessarily satisfies the bounds 
We thus obtain in a quite general setting the often-remarked "impossibility of 
negative bubbles" (e.g., Diba and Grossman, 1988; Blanchard and Fischer, 1989. 
Chapo 5). Substituting this definition and (2.2) into (2.1) we get 
a(i)u(st)' = L a(sHl)u(st+l)'e(sH1Ist) (2.4) 
8 +1 18
' ' 
Hence, we also find in this context that any vector of asset pricing bubbles must 
satisfy a (generalized) martingale property. In particular, (2.4) implies that if 
there exists a non-zero pricing bubble on any security at date t, there must exist 
a bubble as we11 on sorne securities at date T, with positive probability, at every 
date T > t. Furthermore, if there exists a bubble on any security in positive 
net supply. then there must have existed a bubble as well on sorne security in 
positive net supply at every predecessor of the node st; there is thus a clear sense 
in which a bubble can "never start" , in a rational expectations equilibrium with 
free disposal. 
One case in which (2.2) results in an unambiguous definition of the fundamen­
tal value, even with incomplete markets, is that of a security of finite maturity. In 
such case, the fundamental value of a given security j, defined as in (2.2), is the 
same for aH state-price processes a E A(st), and the uniquely defined fundamental 
value is 1j(SI) = qj(st), so that there is no pricing bubble for this security. (The 
proof of this assertion simply repeats that of Proposition 2.1, taking t to be a 
date far enough in the future so that ej(sTlst) = Ofor a11 sTlst and xj(sTlst) = O 
for a11 sTlst with T> t.) 
In the case of securities of infinite maturity in an economy with incomplete 
markets, the fundamental value need not to be the same for a11 state-price pro­
cesses consistent with the available securities retums. But even in this case, we 
can at any rate define the range of variation in the fundamental value, given the 
restrictions upon possible state prices implied by observed securities prices. Let 
{x(st)} again be a non-negative stream of resources. Then at any node st we may 
define 
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This is c1early a meaningful expression, though the sum may diverge (in which 
case we say that Vz = +00). Note, however,that the present value need not be 
uniquely defined, except in the case of complete markets. 
Similarly, for any state-price process a E A(st), 
1 00 f(stjp,a)' == ~ L L a(sT)p(sT)'x(sTlst) (2.2)
a(s ) T=t+l,TI,1 
defines a k(st)-vector of fundamental values for the securities tracied at node sto 
Observe that the fundamental value is defined only with reference to a particular 
state-price process. Sorne properties of the fundamental value are, however, true 
regardless of the state prices chosen. 
PROPOSITION 2.1: At each st E N, the vector of fundamental values defined 
in (2.2) is well-defined for any a E A(st), and satisfies 
PROOF: Equation (2.1) may be written 
a(st)q(i)' = L a(st+l)p(st+l)'x(st+ 1 Ist) + L a(i+ 1 )q(st+l)'e(i+1 j st) 
SI+lis l ,1+ 11s
' 
Repeated application of this equation yields 
T . . . 
a(st)q(st)' = L L a(sT)p(sT)'x(sT¡st) + L a(sT)q(sT)'e(sTlst) 
T=t.+l sTls! sl'ls l 
for any horizon T > t. But e(sTlst) ~ O, which together with (1.2) implies 
T 
a(st)q(i)' ~ L L a(sT)p(sT)'x(sTli) (2.3)
T=t+l,TI,1 
Since x(sTlst ) ~ Ofor a11 ST, the right-hand side of (2.3) is a non-decreasing series '. 
in t'. Because of (2.3), the series is bounded aboYe, and so must converge to a 
limit no greater than the left-hand side.• 
Note that the assumption of free disposal is used to guarantee (2.3). In the 
absence of free disposal, neither the bound nor the convergence need obtain, even 
if a security is a claim to a positive fiow of goods. (See Brock, 1990 and Santos 
and Woodford. 1993, Example 5.4.) 
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PROPOSITION 2.2: Let {x(sr)} be aprocess satisfying x(sr) ~ O at each srlst, 
and let jtz(st) and 2I.z(st) be defined as above. Then 
jtz(st) = sup vz(st¡P, a), (2.7a) 
.OEA(,I) 
(2.7b) 
Suppose furthennore that 1rz(Sr) < +00 for all srlst. (For this it suffices, because 
of (2.7b), that there exists a state-price process a E A(st) such that vz(st¡p,a) < 
+00.) Then 
(2.7c) 
The proof is given in the Appendix. The possible failure of (2.7c) in the absence 
of additional hypotheses is illustrated by the follov.'ing example. 
EXAMPLE 2.1. Let N consist of SO and two date t nodes, ~t and r¡t, fol' each 
t ~ 1. Node SO has two irnmediate successors ~l and r¡l; every other node has 
only one immediate successor (the successor of ~t being ~t+l, and of "It being "It+d. 
There is a single consumption good at each node, which we choose as numeraire 
(p(st) = 1 for each st). One security is traded at each node, and q(st) = 1 for each 
st, R(st) = 1 for each st with t ~ 1. Clearly there are no arbitrage opportunities at 
any node. Consider the value of a resource stream given by x(~t) = O, x(r¡t) = 1/2, 
for aH t ~ 1. 
In this example, the set of state-price processes a E A(sO) is the set of processes 
of the form 
a(~t)/a(sO) - O: for aH t ~ 1 
a(''1d/a(so) - 1 - O: for a11 t ~ 1 
for arbitrary O< O: < 1. In the case of any such process, vz(r¡t¡P, a) = +00 for aH 
t ~ 1, and 50 vz(so¡p,a) = +00 as wel!. Thus 
inf vz(so¡P, a) = +00 
aEA(sO) 
On the other hand, it is easily seen that 1rz(sO) = O. For any portfolio trading 
plan with z(SO) < O, that is feasible apart from the borrowing limits, would have 
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to involve z(et) < o for a11 t ~ 1, so that there is no finite date at which wealth 
becomes non-negative. Therefore, (2.7b) is satisfied in this example, but (2.7c) 
fails at the initial node so. This·does not contradict Proposition 2.2, because in 
this case 1r:r(l1t) = +00 for a11 t ~ ,L. 
Thus for any state-price process, and any security j traded at st, the funda­
mental value, defined as in (2.2), must lie between the bounds Li(st) and 1fzi (st), 
where xi refers to the dividend process {xi (s" 1st )}. These are furthennore the 
tightest bounds with this property. For it follows from Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 
that the bounds Li(Sr) and ñ:ri(sr) are finite, and satisfy 
1L.ri(Sr) ~ ñ:ri(sr) ~ q(sr)'ej(srlst) < +00 
at all srlst. Hence (2.7c) applies in the case of a dividend stream {xi(srlst)}. 
In the event that 1rzi (st) =ñxi (st), the fundame,ntal value is uniquely defined. 
This is necessarily true in the case of complete markets, but can also occur with 
incomplete markets. On the other hand, with incomplete markets it is possible 
that the two bounds do not coincide. In such a case, the fundamental value may 
be different for different values of the state-price processes. Hence the existence 
or not of a pricing bubble may be ambiguous. There unambiguously exists no 
bubble if Zkj (SI) = .7r:ri (st) = qj(st); and conditions under which this must be 
true in equilibrium, even with incomplete markets, are given in Theorem 3.3. 
Likewise, there unambiguously exists a pricing bubble if ñ:rj(st) < qj(st). But 
these two cases are not the only possibilities, in the case of incomplete markets. If 
1[xj (8t) < 7rx j(st) = qj(é), the existence or not of a bubble depends upon which of 
the state-price processes a E A(st) one chooses.6 Conditions are given in Theorem 
3.1 for the latter equality to hold, but that do not preclude the inequality holding 
as well; and Example 4.5 illustrates this possibility. 
Before turning to a further analysis of the bubble component of securities 
prices, it is useful to define a particular type of borrowing limit that will be used 
subsequently. One may say that borrowing is limited only by one 's ability to 
repay out of one's future endowment if 
(2.8) 
aTo be precise, Proposition 2.2 implies only that if1fzj(sC) = qj(SC), there exists a state-price 
process a E A(sC) in terms of which the bubble component of the price is arbitrarily small; it 
need not be possible to make it zero, as A(st) is not c1osed. But Theorem 3.1 gives sufficient 
conditions not simply for 1rzi(SC) to equal qj(SC), but for there to exist a state-price process in 
terms of which fzi(SC;p, a) = qj(SC), as shown by explicit construction of the state prices. 
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for each st E Nh\Ñh. These are the tightest borrowing limits with the propeity 
that any plan satisfying (1.1a)-(1.1b) at a11 nodes, and such that there exists a 
date T after which wealth is always non-negative, is permissible. It can be shown 
that, even in the case oí incomp~ete markets, 8uch borrowing limits never bind 
(effectively) at any finite date. Thus they represent a constraint only upon the 
asymptotic behavior of a household's debt, and indeed it can be shown to be 
equivalent to the kind of "transversality condition" used to define the budget 
constraint of infinitely lived households by authors such as Scheinkman (1977, 
1988) and Brock (1979, 1982). In the case of finitely lived households, these 
borro'Wing limits are equivalent to imposing no borrowing limits at all non-terminal 
nodes.7 An important consequence of this specification is the fo11owing. 
PROPOSITION 2.3: Suppose that household h has borrowing limita of the form 
(2.8). Then the existence of an optimal plan (eh, Zh) for the price processes (p,q) 
implies that 1I:wh(st) < + 00 at each st E N h, so that there is a finite borrowing 
limit at each node. Furthermore, the borrowing limit can equivalently be expressed 
as 
Bh(st) =. inf Vwh(st;p, a) < +00 
aEA(st) 
Thus borro"'ing limits of this kind represent an obvious generalization, to the case 
of incomplete markets, of the familiar "present-value budget constraint" for the 
case of complete markets. One reason that this result, proved in the Appendix, 
is of interest is that the present value of a household's endowment must be finite, 
at least for sorne possible definitions of the present value, in any equilibrium; this 
wil! prove useful in Section 3. 
The aboye bounds on fundamental values also allow us to extend to the case 
of incomplete markets the notion of an equilibrium in which the aggregate endow­
ment of the economy has a finite value, a case known to be of special interest in 
the theory of infinite-horizon economies with complete markets (see, e.g., Wilson, 
1981). Vv'e wil! say that the aggregate endowment is bounded by a portfolio trading 
plan jf 1tw(st) < +00 for all st E N. In the case of complete markets at every 
node, this condition is equivalent to a finite value for the aggregate endowment, 
if it is priced using the unique state-price process; this is a simple consequence 
of Proposition 2.2. In the case of incomplete markets, it implies a finite value 
regardless of the state-price process used, and indeed a bounded value for a11 
positive state-price processes. We have stated the definition in terms of the ag­
7See Levine and Zame (1994), Magill and Quinzii (1994), and Santos and Woodford (1993, 
Seco 2) for further discussion of the properties of borrowing limits of this kind. 
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gregate endowment {w(st)}, which is not the aggregate supply of consumption 
goods in general. The aggregate supply of goods is instead given by {w( st)}, 
where w(st) = w(st) + d(st)z(st.- 1) ror a11 st with t > 0, and w(SO) = w(sO). 
However, it readily follows from (2.3) and (2.7a) that 'ñ'w(st) < +00 ir and only if 
'ñ'w(st) < +00. 
The definition of this condition involves the spot price process (p, q). We can, 
however, state conditions relating only to the specification of an economy that 
imply that in any equilibrium the condition must hold. The fo11owing is a simple 
example. 
LEMMA 2.4: Suppose that there exísts a portfolío Z E 'R,~(,O) such that 
(2.9) 
for all st E N wíth t > O. Then in any equilíbrium the aggregate endowment is 
bounded by a portfolío tradíng plan. 
I\ote that condition (2.9) does not say anything about the initial net supply 
of securities z(SO) -it is only necessary that Z represent a portfolio that can be 
purchased in the spot markets at so. The proof is simple. In any equilibrium, 
p(st) ~ O, q(st) ~ O, x(sflsO) z ~ O, and e(stlsO)z ~ O for a11 sto Then consider 
the portfolio trading plan defined by z(st) = e(stlsO)i for a11 st. For any node st, 
this together with the plan x = w satisfies conditions (2.6) for a11 sTlst . It then 
follows irnmediately from the definition of 7r that 
The case of an aggregate endowment that is bounded by a portfolio trading 
plan seems to be of considerable interest on empirical grounds. Abel et al. (1989) 
sho", that for several advanced industrial economies, the difference between gross 
returns to capital and gross investment, considered as a fraction of gross national 
product, appears to be consistently bounded aboye zero. In terms of our notation, 
this means that observations are consistent with the supposition that for sorne 
k> O, 
(2.10) 
for a11 st, where D(st) denotes the difference between the returns to capital and 
investment at node sto Now suppose that claims to the aggregate capital stock 
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are arnong the set of traded securities.8 At any node st, let z(st) ~ Odenote the 
portfolio consisting of a claim to the aggregate capital stock. Then consider the 
consumptionjportfolio trading plan that consists ofholding at each node k- 1 z(st), 
and consuming at each node the aggregate goods supply w(st). Given (2.10), this 
plan satisfies conditions (2.6) for·all st with t > O, and involves a non-negative 
portfolio at each node. It then follows that 7t,,¡¡(st) ~ k-1q(st)'z(st) < +00 at each 
st E N, so that 7tw(st) < +00 as well. Hence the empirical support for the Abel 
et al. criterion suggests that the case of an aggregate endowment bounded by a 
portfolio trading plan is of considerable practical importance. 
As a simple illustration of why the condition is important, we offer the follow­
ing resulto . 
PROPOSITION 2.5: Let preferences satisfy (A.l) and consider an equilibrium 
{p, q, eh, Zh}. For any node st E N, let {O'( s")} be the vector of bubble components 
for the securities traded at each node s,.¡st, when ft¡.ndamental values are defined 
using state prices a E A(s'), and suppose that vw(st;p,a) < +00 (and hence 
vw(s';p,a) < +(0) when these state prices are used. Suppose furthennore that 
there exists a non-zero bubble on some security in positive net supply traded at st, 
so that O'(s')'z(st) > O. Then for any K < 00, there exist a date T and a node 
sT[s' at which 
O'(ST)'Z(ST) > Kp(ST)'W(ST) 
That is, there is a positive probability that the total size of the bubble component 
on all securities in existence becomes an arbitrarily large multiple of the value of 
the aggregate supply of goods in the economy. 
The proof of this proposition simply follows from the basic observation that 
by the martingale property of pricing bubbles (equality (2.4)) we must have that 
8\\'e can represent an economy with capital and production in terms oC our framework by 
taking the production plan as given, rather than something to be determined. We also replace 
household's labor endowments at each node with a share oC output at that node, oC value equal 
to their wages in the production economy, and replace the firm sector with a perpetuity whose 
"dividends" at each node equal the aggregate output not used Cor investment purposes, net oC the 
shares oC output imputed to households in replacement oC their wages. If there are non.produced 
inputs other than labor, they are dealt with similarly: the parto of households' endowments oC 
these materials that are used in production are replaced by a share oC output oC value equal 
to the Cactor payments in the production economy. Then D(st) is the value oC the dividends 
at Dode st on this perpetuity. The necessary conditions Cor an equilibrium oC the endowment 
economy so constructed are among the necessary conditions for an equilibrium oC the original 
production economy. In Cact, our results extend rather directly to production economies, but 
we do not take this up here. 
18 
a(st)u(st)'z(st) =E,TI,' a(sT)u(ST)'Z(ST) rernains constant for aH T > t, whereas 
E,TI,t a(sT)p(sT)ÜJ(sT) converges to zero, as Tgoes to 00, since vw(st;p,a) < +00. 
3. Main Results 
As one rnight expect frorn Proposition 2.5, a finite value for the aggregate endow­
ment severely restricts the class of cases in which pricing bubbles on securities 
in positive net supply are possible at al!. This is because sorne household or 
households must accumulate vast wealth in such an equilibrium as the value of 
their consumption goes to zero. It is not obvious, however, that such behavior is 
inconsistent with optimization in our intertemporal framework with incomplete 
markets, borrowing limits, and incomplete participation of agents in the entire 
sequence of markets. Indeed, Exarnple 4.5 illustrates that for sorne state-price 
processes pricing bubbles may arise in an equilibrium of a simple econorny with a 
representative consumero Our most general result is the foHowing. 
THEOREM 3.1: Let preferences satisfy (A.l), and consider an equilibrium 
{p,q,ch,Zh}. For any Si E N, suppose that ftw(st) < +00. Then there exists 
a state-price process a E A(st) such that qj(sT) = fj(sT;a,p) for all sTlst , for 
each security j traded at sT that is either (a) of finite maturity or (b) in positive 
net supply (i.e., for which Zj(ST) > O). 
Thus, under the hypotheses of the theorem, there are, in a certain sense, no 
speculative bubbles, except possibly on securities that are both of finite maturity 
and in zero net supply. On the other hand, this theorem does not assert that there 
is an unambiguous fundamental value for any security in positive net supply; it 
implies that qj(sT) = 1r.:r;(sT) for any such security, but it does not exclude the 
possibility that qj(sT) > 1[x;(ST), so that there also exist state-price processes a E 
A(st) in terms of which the market price of the security exceeds its fundamental 
value. 
A case in which Theorem 3.1 implies an unequivocal result is the following. 
COROLLARY 3.2: Suppose that one ofthe securities traded at each node st E N 
is fiat money (defined in Section 1), and consider an equilihrium satisfyíng the 
hypotheses of Theorem 3.1 at all nodes. Then fiat money has no value in this 
equilibrium; i.e., qm(st) = O for each st E N. 
This fol1ows directly from the theorem, for the fundamental value of fiat money 
is zero at aH nodes, regardless of the state prices used to compute present values. 
Theorem 3.1 can be strengthened if one assumes a sufficient degree of impa­
tience. 
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THEOREM 3.3: Let preferences satisfy (A.l) and (A.2), and consider an equi­
lihrium {p,q,ch,Zh}. For any node st e N, assume that there exists a state-price 
process a e A(st) such that vw(st¡P, a) < +00 when these state prices are used. 
Then q;(ST) = /;(ST¡ a,p) for al1 sTlst, for each security j traded at ST that is ei­
ther (a) 01 finite maturity or (b) in positive net 8upply (i. e., lor which z; (sT) > O). 
This result is an improvement of Theorem 3.1 in two respects. First of al1, if 
1tw (st) < +00, then given the stronger assumption on preferences it follows that 
there unambiguously exist no bubb1es regardless of the state prices chosen, since 
for a11 such state-price processes, q;(ST) = /;(sT). And second, it extends the 
class of cases for which bubbles do not existo It is now sufficient that Vw (st¡ p, a) 
be finite fol' some state-price process, rather than it having to be true for a11 sets 
of state prices consistent with the values of traded securities. 
These theorems app1y to a broad class of economies in which the equilibrium 
va1ue of the aggregate goods supp1y is bounded. We now give two simple sets of 
restrictions upon economic primitives that guarantee applicability of the theorems 
in any equilibrium. Both resu1ts app1y regard1ess of the possib1e incomp1eteness 
of markets. 
COROLLARY 3.4: Let preferences satisfy (A.l) and suppose that there exists 
a porlfolio z satisfying (2.9) for all st with t > O. Then for any equilibrium 
{p, q, eh, Zh} there exists a state price process a E A(sO) such that the conclu­
sions of Theorem 3.1 hold. 1f in addition preferences satisfy (A.2), then these 
conclusions hold for every state-price process a e A(sO). 
This result follows directly from Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, making use of Lemma 2.4. 
It shou1d be pointed out that if preferences do not satisfy (A.2), a pricing bubble 
may exist in terms of some state prices; this is illustrated by Example 4.5 below. 
This corollary implies that we11-known examples of models that a110w for val­
ued fiat money, such as the overlapping generations model of Samuelson (1958) or 
the consumption-smoothing model of Bewley (1980), no longer admit monetary 
equilibria if additional markets are opened for securities of the kind assumed in 
the corollary.9 
COROLLARY 3.5: Let preferences satisfy (A.l) and (A.2), and suppose that 
there exist an infinitely lived household h E H and é > O such that (i) wh(st) ~ 
éW(st) for each st e N, and (ii) the borrowing limit Bh is specified by (2.8). Then 
for any equilibrium {p, q, eh, Zh}, there exists a state-price process a e A(SO) such 
that the conclusions of Theorem 3.3 hold. 
'l0n the possibility o( monetary equilibria when such markets are closed, see Examples 4.1, 
4.2, and 4.4 below. 
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This result follows from Theorem 3.3, making use of Proposition 2.3. By the 
proposition, there must exist sorne state-price process a E A(sO) in terms of which 
Vw"(so¡P, a) < +00. By assumptlon, wh ~ éW. Hence, vw(so¡P, a) < +00 as wel!. 
Consequently, a E A(sO) is a stat~-price process for which the theorem applies. 
Note that (A.2) is not needed for such result to hold in the case of complete 
markets. For if the state prices a E A(sO) are unique (up to normalization of an 
arbitrary a(sO) > O), Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 then imply that 1tw"(SO) < +00, so 
that Theorem 3.1 applies. Nor is it necessary, in the case of complete markets, 
that there be a single household whose endowment satisfies hypothesis (i) of the 
corollary. It suffices that there be a finite col1ection f¡ of households, each with 
borrowing limits given by (2.8) and for each of whom N h has a finite number 
of root nodes (nodes with no predecessors), such that the aggregate endowrnent 
of the households in f¡ satisfies hypothesis (i). For then Proposition 2.3 implies 
that for each hE f¡ and for each root node s" of N~,vw,,(s"¡p,a) < +00 in terms 
of the unique state-price process a. Surnming ayer aH root nodes of Nh for each 
h E f¡, and summing over aH h E f¡, yields a finite number for the aggregate 
endowment of the group, and hence for the aggregate endowment of the economy. 
Then Theorem 3.1 applies. lO 
Finally. (A.2) is not needed in the case of a representative household. This 
follows from a result proved below (Lernma 3.6) on the asymptotic evolution of 
individual savings under an optimal plan, since in this simple case such savings 
must constitute at all times the aggregate supply of securities. 
CoroHary 3.5 implies that monetary equilibria necessarily cease to exist in an 
overlapping generations model, if there exists a family whose successive genera­
tions are linked by altruistic bequests, and so behave like a single infinitely lived 
household (as argued by Barro, 1974), if that family controls at least a fraction 
é > Oof total resources at aH dates, and the family is able to borrow against its 
future endowment income. The corollary similarly implies that monetary equilib­
ria are not possible in the model of Bewley (1980), if sorne household type has 
endowment bounded away from zero in all states, and that household's borrowing 
limit is of the form (2.8). This shows the extent to which Bewley's monetary 
equilibria depend upon restrictions on borrowing limits. ll 
The proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 both rely upon demonstrations that ex­
plosive growth of aggregate wealth of the kind indicated in Proposition 2.5 is 
lOThis last result generalizes one oC Wilson (1981). 
11 Exarnple 4.4 provides a counterexarnple, but it depends upon every household type having 
a zero endowrnent in sorne states. 
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inconsistent with optimization by all households. These arguments are well un­
derstood in the context of complete market economies (e.g., Brock (1979, 1982), 
Scheinkman (1977, 1988) and Wilson (1981)). The presence of incomplete markets 
and arbitrary borrowing limits allows for a broader clus of equilibrium allocations, 
and requires a more subtle approach to this problem. In proving Theorem 3.1 we 
shall rely on the following preliminary resulto 
LEMMA 3.6: Let preferences satisfy (A. 1), and consider an equilibrium {p, q, eh, Zh}. 
Then for any st E N and any h E H(st), q(st)'Zh(st) ~ 1t(e"_w,,)+(st), where 
(eh - Wh)+(S~) == max(eh(sT) - Wh(ST), O) for all sTlst with T> t. 
PROOF: Suppose instead that q(st)'Zh(st) exceeds the upper bound stated. 
Then there exists a portfolio trading plan z with 
(3.1a) 
such that the joint plan (eh, z) satisfies (1.1a) and 
q(sT)'Z(sT) ~ o (3.1b) 
for a11 sTlst with T > t. This foÚows from the definition of 1r(e"-w")+ (st), and the 
fact that eh(sT) ~ Wh(ST) + (eh - wh)+ (ST). 
Then define a plan Zh for the nodes ST E Nh by setting Zh(ST) = Zh(ST) except 
on the subtree ST\st, where Zh(ST) = Z(ST) for sTlst such that ST E Nh\Ñh, and 
Zh(ST) = Ofor sTlst E Ñh. It follows from (3.1b) that the substitution of Ofor 
z(st) at nodes sTlst E Ñh does not lead to violation of (1.1a). Thus the joint 
plan (eh, Zh) satisfies (1.1a)-(1.1b). Furthermore, (3.1b) implies that it satisfies 
(1.1c) at each ST E Nh\Ñh as well, since Bh(sT) ~ Oat each such node. Finally, 
(3.1a) implies that (Lb) is a strict inequality for this plan at node st. Thus it 
is possible to increase consumption at node st without lowering it at any other 
node, which by (A.1) must be preferred. But this contradicts the hypothesis that 
(eh, Zh) is optimal for h given prices (p, q) .• 
LEMMA 3.7: Let the hypotheses of Theorem 9.1 be satisfied. Then for any 
st E N and any O< 6 < 1, there exist a state-price process a E A(st) and a date 
T > t such that 
(3.2) 
PROOF: (1) We first establish that for any f > 0, there exists a date t > 0, and 
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a set of state prices á E A(st) such that 
1 ~ _( T T
-(t) L.J a s )7r,¡, (s ) ~ E (3.3)
á s ,Tj,t 
for aH T ~ t. As pointed out in Section 2, if 1tw(st) < +00 then 7r,¡,(st) < +00 
as well. Proposition 2.2 then entails that for every E > O there must exist sorne 
á E A(st) such that v,¡,(st¡P, á) > 7r,¡,(st) - f. Accordingly, there must exist a date 
t such that 
(3.4) 
for aH T ~ t. But the proof of Proposition 2.2 also implies that 
Cornparing this last expression with (3.4) shows that li is an example of a set of 
state prices for which (3.3) holds. 
(2) It only suffices to prove the lemma for the case in which q(st)'z(st) > O. 
Given any O < 6 < 1, let O < 0:, /3 < 1 be two numbers such that 0:/3 = 6. Then 
let H(st) be a finite subset of H(st) with the property that 
L q(StyZh(st) ~ o:q(st)'z(st) 
hEiJ 
(Because H(st) is countable and aggregate savings q(st)'z(st) are finite, such a 
finite subset must exist.) Then it follows from (3.3) that there exists a date T 
and li E A(st) such that 
But Lemma 3.6 irnplies that for any sT\st 1 
L q(sT)'Zh(sT) ~ L 1t(t'h_wh)+(ST) ~ 7r,¡,(sT) 
hEiJ hEH 
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r
 
and hence that 
L L Wh(ST) $ L ii(ST)1t,¡¡(ST) $ (1 - {3) L Wh(st) (3.5) 
.TI.l heiJ .TI.I heiJ
 
.TeNh
 
introducing the notation, Wh(sT) =a(ST)q(ST)'Zh(ST) , and it is understood that 
the summation of the first two terms is over aH sTlst at time T. 
By Assumption (A.1), an optimal plan for any household necessarily involves 
the budget constraint (l.la) being satisfied with equality at each node. Suppose 
that for any h e H(st), we multiply both sides of this equation by ii, and sum 
over aH sr 1st , sr e Nh, with dates t +1 $ r $ T. Introducing the further notation 
we obtain 
T TL L ch(sr) = L L nh(sr) +Wh(st) - L ";h(ST) (3.6) 
r=t+l .r,.1 r=t+l .rl.t .TI.l 
~¿Nh ~eNh ~eNh 
(In cancelling aH terms involving wealth in intermediate periods, we have used 
the restriction that zh(sr) = Oat each sr e Ñh.) Because endowments are non­
negative, the left-hand side cannot be smaHer than the sum of the two final terms 
on the right-hand side. Summing both sides of the inequality over the members 
of H(st) and using (3.5) yields 
LT L L ch(sr) > L wh(i) - L L Wh(ST) 
r=t+l .rl.1 heiJ heiJ .TI.I heiJ 
.reNh .TeNh 
~ {3 L Wh(st) 
heiJ 
~ 6a(st)q(i)' z(st) 
As the value of aggregate consumption must be at least as large as the value of 
consumption by households in H(st), this establishes (3.2).• 
The theorem is then proved as foHows. 
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PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1: Fixing °< 6 < 1, one first observes that one 
may select a system of state prices a E A(st) and a sequence of dates {Tn} for 
n = 0,1,2, ..., with To = t, Tn+1 > Tn for each n, so that for any n and any node 
sTn 1st , 
Tn +lI: I: L ch(sr) ~ 6a(sTn)q(sTn)'z(sTn) (3.7) 
r=Tn+l ".. ¡,Tn heH(,,") . 
The construction is recursive. Suppose, for any n ~ O, that Tn has been chosen, 
as well as state prices a(sr) for a11 nodes srlst with dates r :::. Tn. (For the case 
n = O, set To = t and choose an arbitrary normalization for a(st).) Then consider 
any node sTJ1. By Lemma 3.7, there exists a system of state prices á E A(sTn) 
and a date T(sTn) such that (3.2) holds, and it follows that (3.2) holds as we11 
for a11 dates T ~ T(sTn). It is also possible to choose á so that á(sTn) = a(sTn), 
since the normalization of the state prices referred to in Lemma 3.7 is arbitrary. 
Then choose TJ1 +1 = max,TnT(sTn). The maximum is achieved because the set of 
nodes at each date is finite. Finally, for each sTn, extend the state prices to the 
nodes srl sTJ1 with dates Tn + 1 :::. r :::. TJ1 +1 by setting a(sr) = a(sr). One may 
then repeat the construction, replacing n by n + 1. 
Substituting (1.3a) into inequality (3.7) and summing over all nodes at date 
TJ1 . we obtain 
Tn +l 
¿a(sTJ1)q(sTJ1)':;(sTJ1):::' 6- 1 ¿ ¿a(sr)p(sr)'ÜJ(sr) 
sTn r=Tn +l ," 
Summing over n, we then have 
oc oc ¿ ¿a(sTJ1)q(sTJ1)'z(sTJ1) :::. 6- 1 L ¿a(sT)p(sT)'ÜJ(sT) < +00 
J1=O sTn T=t+l sT 
where use is made of the assumption that 1Tw (S') < +00, and hence that 1Tw(St) < 
+00 for t = To. Then since each term in the infinite sum on the left-hand side 
must be non-negative, it follows that 
JL~ L a(sTn)q(sTn)'z(sTn) == ° (3.8) 
sTn 
On the other hand, iterated application of (2.4) implies 
a(st)a(st)'z(st) = L a(sT)a(sT)'z(sT) 
,TI'· 
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AIso, by virtue of Proposition 2.1, q(sT) ~ U(sT). Given that ail the terms involved 
in these expressions are non-negative, we must have Uj(sT)Zj(sT) = O for each 
security j traded at any node sTlst. Then Zj(sT) > O implies that Uj(sT) = O, 
so that there is no bubble component to the value of any security in positive net 
supply. The same conclusion holds for the case of any security of finite maturity 
as established in Section 2.• 
In proving Theorem 3.3, we rely upon the fol1owing stronger version of Lemma 
3.6, that is possible under the stronger hypothesis on preferences. 
LEMMA 3.8: Let preferences satisfy (A.1) and (A.2) for h E H. For given 
prices (p,q), let (Eh,zh) be an optimal plan for h, where c"(st) $ w(st) for each 
st E Nh. Then for any st E N, and any state-price process a E A(st) for which 
vw(st; p, a) < +00, one must hatle 
OC' ¿ ¿ a(s")p(s")'ch(s") ~ a(st)vwh (st; p, a) + a(st)q(st)'zh(st) (3.9) 
,,=t+t' ."1.1 
s"eNh 
where the last. term is zero if st ~ N h. 
PROOF: Note first that if N h is a finite set, (3.9) fol1ows immediately from 
(3.6) since the final term in (3.6) must vanish for large enough T. More generally, 
one can bound the s-ize of that term, for one can show that 
(3.10) 
and aU sT, where ",¡,h is the factor referred to in (A.2). 
For suppose that (3.10) is violated at some ST E N h. Then another feasible 
plan for h is (eh, Zh), defined by 
(e~ (sT), ch(sT), c~ (ST)) = (e~ (sT), eh (ST) +w(sT), ,hE~ (ST)) 
(z~ (ST), Zh(ST), z~ (sT)) _ (z~ (ST), ,hZh(ST)"hz~ (ST)) 
using the notation introduced in (A.2). By Assumption (A.2), this alternative 
allocation must be preferred to (eh, Zh). Thus we obtain a contradiction, and so 
(3.10) must hold at a11 nodes. Substituting (3.10) into (3.6) then yields 
T TL L Ch(s")+(1-,ht 1 L a(sT)p(sT)'w(sT) ~ L L nh(s")+Wh(st) 
,,=t+l ."1.' .TI.' ,,=t+l .,.,.1 
~eNh sTeNh ,eNh 
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Now let us take the limit of each term in the aboye inequality as T -+ oo. The 
faet that Vw(st¡ p, a) < +00 implies that Vw"(st¡ p, a) < +00 for each h, so that the 
first term on the right-hand side has a we11-defined limit equal to vw,,(st¡P, a). It 
also implies that vu;(st¡p,a) < +00, which in turn yields that v~,,(stjp,a) < +00, 
so that the first term on the left-hand side has a we11-defined, finite limito Finally, 
the fact that vu;(st jp,a) < +00, together with the assumption that ÜJ(ST) ~ Oat 
a11 nodes, implies that the second term on the left-hand side converges to zero. 
This establishes (3.9).• 
The Theorem is then proved as follows. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3: Given Assumptions (A.1)-(A.2), the hypotheses of 
Lemma 3.8 necessarny hold for each h E H, in any equilibrium. Summing (3.9) 
over h, and substituting equilibrium condition (1.3b) we obtain 
LOC' L L ch(sr) ~ a(st)vw(st;p, a) +a(st)q(s')'z(st) 
r=t+l .r¡.l hEH(sr) 
sreN" 
Note that because of the assumption that vw(st¡P, a) < +00, the infinite sum 
on the left-hand side must also be we11-defined and finite. Then, substituting 
equilibrium condition (1.3a) it follows that 
00L L a(sr)p(sr)'d(sr)z(sr - 1) ~ a(st)q(st)'z(st) 
r=t+l sris' 
which in turn implies 
00L L a(sr)p(sr)'x(sr¡st)z(st) ~ a(st)q(st)'z(st) 
r=t+l srlsl 
On the other hand, Proposition 2.1 shows that the left-hand side of this inequality 
cannot exceed the right. Hence the weak inequality must actua11y hold as an 
equality, which implies that O'(st)'z(st) = O. Thus we can now conclude, as in 
proof of Theorem 3.1, that the fundamental value must equal the market price 
in the case of any security in positive net supply or of finite maturity, for each 
sTls t •• 
4. Examples of Rational Asset Pricing Bubbles 
The non-existence results for pricing bubbles in the previous seetion depend upon 
a number of assumptions. In this section, we demonstrate the importance of these 
27 
assumptions by presenting a number of counter-examples, in which rational asset 
pricing bubbles do exist, when one or another of the assumptions are violated. 
First of a11, even when a11 other hypotheses of Coro11ary 3.5 obtain, a pricing 
bubble is possible if no household is endowed with a positive fraction of aggregate 
wealth. The fo11owing example also illustrates that even when all other hypotheses 
of Theorem 3.3 obtain there may be no state-price process a E A(st) satisfying 
vw(st;p, a) < +00 if there does not exist an initial portfolio satisfying (2.9). We 
furthermore note that the fo11owing equilibrium is a counter-example to Coro11ary 
3.2 as we11, as· fiat money has a positive exchange value. 
EXAMPLE 4.1. Here we recall the overlapping generations model of fiat money 
of Samuelson (1958) and Gale (1973).12 There is no uncertainty, so that the 
information structure is a sequence of dates t = 0,1,2.... There is a single 
consumption good at each date, which we will take to be the numeraire for that 
date's spot markets. There is also a single security traded at each date, fiat 
money, defined by d(t) = 0, b(t) = 1, for a11 t ~ 1. Because fiat money has a 
positive exchange value in every period in the equilibrium described below, thel'e 
are complete markets. 
The economy consists of a countably infinite sequence of households h = 0,1,2, 
... , and N° = {O}, Nh = {h - 1,h} for each h ~ 1. Household O seeks to 
maximize its consumption at date O, while each household h ~ 1 seeks to maximize 
U(ch (h-1), ch(h)). Here U(·,·) is a strictIy concave el function, strictly increasing 
in both arguments, defined on 'R~. The endowment of household Ois W2 > Oat 
date O, while the endowment of each household h ~ 1 is W1 > O at date h - 1 
and W2 > Oat date h. Household Ohas an initial endowment of one unit of fiat 
money (the initial net supply), while each household h ~ 1 has none. Fina11y, the 
borrowing limits for each household are of the form (2.8), which is to say, at each 
date t, Bt(t) = O, Bt+1(t) = w2q(t)/q(t + 1), given equilibrium prices such that 
q(t) > Ofol' a11 t. Note that such an economy satisfies a11 hypotheses of Corollary 
3.5 except for (i). 
Let us assume in addition that the partial derivatives, U1(O, W1 + W2) > 
U2(0,W1 + W2), U1(WllW2) < U2(W1,W2).13 Then there exists a rational expec­
tations equilibrium in which q(t) = q. for each t ~ O, where q. > Ois the unique 
quantity such that 
U1(Wl - q., W2 + q.) = U2(W1 - q., W2 + q.) 
12The significance of this model as an example of a raticinal asset pricing bubble is stressed 
by Tirole (1985). 
13These assumptions ensure that we have what Gale (1973) calls the "Samuelson case". 
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The equilibrium consumption allocation is ch(h - 1) = Wl - q. for each h ~ 
1, ch(h) = W2 + q. for each h ~ O, and the equilibrium portfolio allocation is 
zh(h-1) = 1, zh(h) = Ofor each h ~ 1. Note that fiat money has a positive value 
despite the fact that its fundamental value is uniquely defined and equal to zero. 
Now suppose instead that tw<;> types of fiat money are traded at each date, 
defined by d(t) = O, b(t) = /2, for each t ~ 1; and let household O have an 
initial endowment of one unit of each type of money. In this case, one possible 
equilibrium has ql (t) = q., q2(t) = Ofor each t ~ O, with the same consumption 
a11ocation as aboye. This shows that two securities with identical dividend streams 
may nonetheless have different prices. More generally, there exists an equilibrium 
for every pair of non-negative numbers ql(t) = ql and q2(t) = q2 for each t ~ O, 
such that ql + q2 = q., and with the same consumption a11ocation as aboye. 
(This is an example of the indeterminacy of equilibrium exchange rates discussed 
by Kareken and Wallace (1981).) This indeterminacy of the relative size of the 
"bubble components" of the prices of the two assets is an example of something 
that would be missed in using a formalism like that of Gilles and LeRoy (1993), 
that attributes the "bubble component" to the presence of a "payoff at infinity" 
in the security specification.• 
It is often asserted that "short horizons" for traders make rational bubbles 
possible, that would be eliminated if traders were concerned about returns that 
could be realized farther in the future. 14 Overlapping generations models do a110w 
the existence of equilibria with bubbles under certain circumstances where they 
would be excluded in the case of an infinitely lived household, or even in the 
case of a finite number of households. (Reca11 the discussion after Corollary 3.5.) 
But the features of the overlapping generations structure that are crucial in such 
examples are that different households have very different endowment patterns 
and that the economy is not sufficiently productive (Le., the aggregate allocation 
is not bounded by a portfolio trading plan) and not the fact that households can 
trade, or care about consumption. in only a finite number of periods. 
Our next example shows that, even when a11 other hypotheses of Corollary 
3.5 are satisfied, a pricing bubble is possible if borrowing limits are not of the 
form (2.8), in the case in which sorne agents cannot transfer a11 future discounted 
wealth .zr:wh(st) to a given information set sto In this example the lower bound 
2I (st) = +00, and in fact there exists valued fiat money, and this is possible w 
14See , e.g., the remarks oí Stiglitz (1990). The contrast between the results of Tirole (1982) 
for an economy with infinitely lived traders and those of Tirole (1985) for an economy with 
overlapping generations oí two-period lived households is sometimes interpreted in this way. 
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because for each household the borrowing limits effectively bind infinitely often. 
EXAMPLE 4.2. Here we recall a monetary model of Bewley (1980), discussed 
in detail in Sargent (1987, Chap; 6). This is adeterministic model with a single 
consumption good at each date, and fiat money is the only security traded at each 
date. The economy consists of tvio households, h =1,2, each of which trades at 
a11 dates (N h = N), and each of which seeks to maximize 
00 
Uh(Ch ) = ¿.BtU(ch(t)) 
t=O 
where O < .B < 1 and '11(.) is a bounded, strictly increasing, strictIy concave el 
function, defined on 'R+. The endowment of household 1 is Wl > O at all even­
numbered dates and W2 > O at odd-numbered dates, while the endowment of 
household 2 is W2 at even-numbered dates and Wl at odd-numbered ones. House­
hold 2 has an initial endowment of one unit of fiat rhoney (the initial net supply), 
while household 1 has none. Finally, the borrowing limits for each household are 
given by Bh(t) = Ofor a11 t ~ O. 
Let us assume in addition that '11'(0) > .Bu'(w¡ +W2), 'l1'(wd < .BU'(W2)' Then 
there exists an equilibrium in which q(t) = q. for each t ~ O, where q. > Ois the 
unique quantity such that 
The equilibrium consumption a11ocation is ch(t) = W] - q. when h = 1 and t is 
even. 01' h = 2 and t is odd, and W2+q· when h = 1 and t is odd, 01' h = 2 and t is 
even. The equilibrium portfolio al1ocation is Zh(t) = 1 when h = 1 and t is even, 
01' h = 2 and t is odd, and Zh(t) = Owhen h = 1 and t is odd, or h = 2 and t is 
even. Again. fiat money has a positive value despite the fact that its fundamental 
value is zero. 
I\ote that the economy satisfies a11 the assumptions of Corol1ary 3.5 except for 
(ii). In this case the borrowing limits bind for household 1 at every odd date, and 
for household 2 at every even date, and so both households are unable to borrow 
against the value of their future wealth. Indeed, in this equilibrium, 
OC' 
¿a(t)wh(t) = +00 
t=O 
for each household, and as a result the proof of Theorem 3.3 fails since 1l:w = +00. 
This would not be possible if borrowing limits are of the standard form (2.8). 
(But see Example 4.4 below.). 
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Even when the conditions of Theorem 3.1 (01' its coro11aries) are satisfied, 
speculative bubbles are not excluded on securities of infinite maturity in zero net 
supply. The following example illustrates this possibility for an economy satisfying 
the hypotheses of Coro11ary 3.4. 
EXAMPLE 4.3. Again there is' no uncertainty and a single consumption good 
at each date. There is a single security traded at each date, a perpetuity defined 
by d(t) = d > O, b(t) = 1, for a11 t ~ O. The economy consists of two households, 
h = 1,2, with the same preferences and market participation as in Example 4.2. 
Endowments are given by wh(t) = w > O for h = 1,2, and for each t ~ O. 
Household 1 has an initial endowment of 1 unit of the bond, while household 2 
has an initial endowment of -1 units. Thus the bond is in zero net supply; we 
may regard it as a liability of household 2 issued at sorne previous date, and held 
by household 1 at the beginning of period O. We assume that w > d, so that 
household 2 can pay the stream of dividends promised. The borrowing limits for 
each household are of the form (2.8), 01' equivalenÚy (since there are complete 
markets), they are unambiguously defined by the present value of future wealth. 
The following process describes an equilibrium for this economy: 
q(t) = 1 ~ /3d + K/3-t 
el(t) = w + /3d + (l-/3)K 
e2(t) = w -/3d - (1 -/3)K 
-1 (/32d/1 - /3) + K/3 
z (t) = (/3d/1 -/3) + K/3-t 
Z2(t) = -Zl(t) 
Each expression holds for each t ~ O, and K is a constant in the interval O~ K ~ 
~-=.~d. (The lower bound is necessary in order to ensure that q(t) ~ Ofor a11 t; the 
upper bound is necessary in order to ensure that c2 (t) ~ Ofor a11 t.) In the case 
of any such equilibrium, the unique state-price process is given by a(t) = /3t, as a 
result of which the uniquely defined fundamental value of the bond equals 6d. 
Hence there unambiguously exists a pricing bubble in the case of any K > O. 
We could introduce trading in a one-period bond each period, that is in zero 
net supply, without changing any aspect of the aboye equilibrium. If the one­
period bond pays one unit of the consumption good a period later (d2 (t) = 1, 
b2(t) = Ofor a11 t ~ 1), its equilibrium price is q2(t) = /3 for aU t ~ O. Yet even 
31 
with a second bond, the existence of a speculative bubble on the perpetuity does 
not imply the existence of an arbitrage opportunity. This is true even though 
each household trades at the entire infinite sequence of dates. It is not possible, 
for example, to sell short A units of the perpetuity, consume KA, and invest 
ndA in the one-period bond, paying the dividends upon the shorted perpetuity 
in all subsequent periods out of the funds invested in the one-period bond (that 
are rol1ed over each period). The problem with such a plan is that it reduces the 
market value ofthe household's portfolio, q(t)'z(t), by an amount KA{3-t at each 
date t. This must violate the borrowing limit (2.8) for large enough t .• 
It is also worth remarking that if we allow modifications in the net supply of 
securities after date O (e.g., due to government issuance or retirement of secu­
rities), then existence of a speculative bubble under circumstances like those of 
this example requires only that the security be in asymptotically zero net supply. 
Thus, for example, a positive value for fiat money is possible, with a positive 
money supply at all dates, if the quantity of money in the hands of the private 
sector contracts to zero asymptotically.15 
Our examples thus far have all involved complete markets. Incomplete markets 
do. however, make possible sorne qualitatively distinct phenomena. The fol1owing 
example shows that even with a finite number of agents and borrowing limits of 
the form (2.8). a speculative bubble is possible in the case of incomplete markets. 
The example thus illustrates the necessity of condition (i) in Corollary 3.5. 
EXAMPLE 4.4. We present here a variant of a monetary economy analyzed by 
Kehoe, Levine, and Woodford (1992). At each date t, there is realized a random 
state St E {{. 7]}. This follows a Markov process with 
Prob(St+l ={ I St = 7]) = Prob(st+l = 7] I St ={) = 7i' 
where O < íT < 1, given an initial condition So E {{,7]}. A node st E N can 
then be identified with a sequence {so, SI, ... , St} E {{,7]p. There is a single 
consumption good at each node, and a single security is traded, fiat money (again 
in fixed net supply of one unit at all dates). 
The economy consists of two households, h = 1,2, each of which has prefer­
15For instance, see the "hyperdeflationary" equilibria in Woodford (1994). That paper con­
cerns an economv with a cash·in-advance constraint, but "hyperdeflationary" equilibria exist in 
which the constr~int never binds, and corresponding monetary equilibria exist for a model with 
no such constraints. 
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ences of the fol'm 
00EL1I"(st){3(i)u(c(st))	 (4.1) 
t=O ,1 
whel'e 1I"(st) is the unconditional- probability of node st, and {3(st) = {3t is the 
discount factor, assumed to be time stationary and the same for both households, 
with O < f3 < 1. The (non-state-contingent) single period utility function u(c) is 
likewise the same fol' both households. The function u : 'R,+ - 'R, is a strictly 
increasing, strictly concave, bounded el function. The endowment of household 
1 is o if the current state St = {, and w > o if the current state St = TI; the 
endowment of household 2 is w > oif St = { and o if St = TI. Thus the aggregate 
endowment is always w > O. One household is initially endowed with one unit of 
money, and the other with zero units; which household is which does not matter. 
Fina11y, both households have borrowing limits of the form (2.8). Because there 
is always a positive probability of receiving zero endowment in each of the next 
T periods, for arbitrarily lal'ge T, it is obvious that 1!:wh(st) = O for h = 1,2, 
and each sr E N, as long as fiat money has positive value for all st E N. This 
is the kind of equilibrium that we considero Hence borrowing is never possible 
(Bh(sr) = Ofol' h = 1,2 and each st E N), though these borrowing limits are of 
the form (2.8). 
\Ve suppose furthel'more that 
{3211"(1 - 71") < _u'_(w_) < _-:,(3_71"~ (4.2)(1 - (3) + (371"(1 - (371") - u'(O) 1 - ¡3 + ¡371" 
This condition defines a non-empty interval of possible values for u'(w)/u'(O), a11 
of which are less than one (as is l'equired by the strict concavity of u(-)). 
\Ve can then show that the following processes describe a rational expectations 
equilibrium with valued fiat money. Let q., q" be the unique quantities satisfying 
u'(w - q.) {371" 
=	 (4.3a)
u'(q· )	 1 - {3 + {371" 
u'(w - q.)q.q•• 
-	
(4.3b)
u'(w) 
Note that (4.3a) has a unique solution O< q. < w, given the second inequality 
in (4.2). Then (4.3b) has a unique solution for q•• as we11; also, the concavity of 
u(·) implies that q•• > q•. In the equilibrium, for each node st E N, t ~ 1, 
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(i)	 if St = eand St-1 = e, c1(st) = 0, c2(st) = W, Z1(st) = o, Z2(st) ="1, 
q(st) = q"j 
(ii) if St = eand St-l = 11, c1(st) = q*, c2(st) = W - q*, zl(st) = o, Z2(st) = 1, 
q(st) = q*; 
(iii) if St = 11 and St-l = e, c1(st) = w - q*, c2(st) = q*, Zl(st) = 1, Z2(st) = o, 
q(st) = q*j and 
(iv) if St = 11 and St-l = 11, c1(st) = w, c2(st) = o, Zl(st) = 1, Z2(st) = o, 
q(st) = q". 
For t = o, the same rules apply, but the clause "if St-l = en is replaced by "if 
Z2(SO) = 1," and the clause "if St-1 = 11" by llif Z1(SO) = 1." 
In other words, in this equilibrium, at the end of trading at each node, the 
entire money supply is held by the household that had a positive endowment at 
that node; the household with no endowment spends during the period any money 
that it holds at the beginning of the periodo The exchange value of money is q* if 
the household that holds the entire money supply at the beginning of the period 
is the household with zero endowment, while it is q** if the household with the 
money has endowment w. At any time, equilibrium is completely determined 
by the current distribution of money holdings and the current distribution of 
endowments, and those two quantities evolve as a finite-state Markov chain. 
It is obYious that the situation just described satisfies aH budget constraints 
and market clearing conditions. It remains only to demonstrate that it represents 
optimal consumption/portfolio behavior for each household, given the equilibrium 
price process {q(st)}. For the sake of brevity, this exercise is omitted here. We 
refer the reader to our previous paper (Santos and Woodford (1993)), where we 
exhibit a system of Lagrange multipliers that satisfy the standard Kuhn-Tucker. 
first-order conditions. which in our concave problem are sufficient for the existence 
of an optimal plan. Thus, these processes define an equilibrium. 
Observe that the existence of a finite number of households does not impIy 
that .ZI:w(st) < +00 for aH sto In this case the vaIue of the aggregate endowment is 
infinite when vaIued using any state prices satisfying (2.1). (This is not accidental, 
as aH other assumptions of Theorem 3.3 hold true here, and such result would 
otherwise imply the non-existence of a pricing bubble in such an economy.) Of 
course, this is equaHy true of Example 4.2. What is different here is that with 
incomplete markets monetary equilibria are possible even with borrowing limits of 
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the form (2.8). For each household, 2[w,,(st) < +00, by Proposition 2.3. But the 
particular state prices that makes the present value of household 1's endowment 
finite imply an infinite value for' the present value of household 2's endowment, 
and vice versa. This is possible ~nly because of boundary endowments and of 
incomplete markets.• 
All of our previous examples have been cases in which a pricing bubble unam­
biguouslyexists. In each case, the "fundamental" value of the security in question 
has been unequivocal1y defined, either because of the existence of complete mar­
kets, or because the security is fiat money. But in the case of incomplete markets, 
the "fundamental" value need not be unambiguously defined. The fol1owing exam­
pIe illustrates this possibility, in the case of an economy satisfying the hypotheses 
of Theorem 3.1 and Coro11ary 3.4. 
EXAMPLE 4.5. Again there is realized a random state St E {~, 1]} at each date 
t ~ 1. In the present case, we assume that this random variable is independently 
and identica11y distributed at each date, with 
Prob(st = ~) = Prob(st = 1]) = 1/2 
A node st E N is identified with a sequence {s), . .. , st} E {~, 1]}t, if t ~ 1, and 
with the nu11 sequence in the case of so. There is a single consumption good at 
each node, and a single security is traded, a perpetuity paying a constant dividend 
forever, defined by d(st) = 1, b(st) = 1, for each st E N with t ~ 1. The perpetuity 
exists in a net supply of one unit at a11 times. 
The economy consists of a single representative household, with preferences of 
the forro (4.1), where u(-) is again a bounded, increasing, concave el function, 
defined on n+. But in contrast to the preceding example, the stochastic discount 
factor {,B(st)} is no\\' defined by 
if S.,. = 1] for a11 T :s t, or if t = O, while 
,B(st) = ( b
j 
)t [2 - b + 23+1(1 + r)jr(l - b)~] '. l+r' 
if s.,. = TI for a11 T :s j, but Sj+l = ~, for sorne O:::; j :s t - 1. Here O< b < 1, and 
r, ~ > O. Note that this specification of the discount factor process implies that 
00 (1 +r)LL1l"(st),B(i) = -r- +~ < 00 
t=O s' 
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so that preferences are increasing and continuous in the product topology. 
The household has no endowment other than its initial endowment'of the 
perpetuity, at any node after thé initial one¡specificaHy, w(sO) = 1, w(st) = O 
for aH st with t 2: 1, and z(sO) = 1. It trades at all nodes st E N. Final1y, its 
borrowing limit is of the form (2.8), given by B(st) = l[UJ(st) = Ofor all st E N. 
Equilibrium is obviously unique, with the equilibrium allocation given by 
c(st) = 1 for each st E N, and with the equilibrium price process for the per­
petuity given by 
q(st) = LB(st)u'(c(st»]-l L:r=t+l L:,T 1r(ST ISt)f3(ST)u'(C(ST» 
=(3(st>-1 L:T>!:t+l L:,T 2t-Tf3(ST) 
for each st E N. From the above specification of the discount factor process, one 
finds that 
1
q(B') = - + A[2(1 + r)]t (4.4a) 
r 
if ST = r¡ for aH T ~ t, or if t = O,·while 
(4.4b) 
if ST = efor any T ~ t. 
This economy satisfies at the given equilibrium aH the conditions in Theorem 
3.1. but violates (A.2) in Theorem 3.3 due to the non-stationarity of the stochastic 
discount factor. By Theorem 3.1 there must exist a state-price process in terms 
of which the price of the security equals its fundamental value. This is obviously 
true for the process 
a(st) = 2-t{3(st) 
On the other hand, there also exist other state-price processes, equaHy consistent 
with (2.1), in terms ofwhich the price process (4.4) involves a speculative bubble. 
One such process is 
a(B') = [2(1 + r)tt (4.5) 
This is consistent with (2.1), since the process (4.4) satisfies the stochastic differ­
ence equation 
q(st) = (1 + rr 1 L 1r(st+l Ist)[l + q(st+l)] (4.6) 
,1+11,1 
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But in terms of the state prices (4.5), the fundamental value of the perpetuity is 
always l/r, so that at any node st such that S'T = r¡ for all T :5 t, there exists a 
bubble component to the perpetuity's market value, equal to 
u(s~) = ~[2(1 +rW 
At al1 other nodes, the bubble component is zero. Under this interpretation, one 
observes a "stochastic bubble" of the kind discussed by Blanchard (1979) and 
many subsequent authors. There is a bubble of size ti. > Oat date zero, which 
then grows at the rate 2(1 + r) if St = r¡ each periodo If ever St = ~, the bubble 
"bursts," and is equal to zero thereafter.• 
This example illustrates that the c1assification of solutions of the form (4.6) 
as "fundamental" or "bubble solutions" along the lines often established is not 
necessarBy desirable in an incomplete markets framework. Theorem 3.3 shows, 
however, that if agents are sufficiently impatient then there unambiguously does 
not exist a pricing bubble for those types of securities in such economies. 
5. Concluding Remarks . 
This paper eontains a fairly systematic study of the conditions under which ratio­
nal asset pricing bubbles may oeeur in an infinite-horizon competitive framework. 
Our analysis has gone beyond the standard perfect capital markets paradigm, 
and has explored ho\\' the interaction of several conditions such as sequentially 
incomplete markets, produetive assets, arbitrary borrowing limits and incomplete 
partieipation of agents in the entire sequence of markets, affects the possibility 
of asset pricing bubbles in a given equilibrium. These extensions of the standard 
eompetitive framework are common place in the modern finance and macroeco­
nome literatures. 
As part of our inquiry we have developed a theory of valuation of arbitrary in­
come streams over an infinite horizon as a consequence of the absence of arbitrage 
opportunities. These results should be useful more general1y in the characteriza­
tion of budget sets and equilibria. Furthermore, these developments of arbitrage 
pricing theory are readily extended to account for additional types of frictions 
often proposed such as liquidity and short-sale constraints, and reserve require­
ments. 
Our main results show the non-existence of asset pricing bubbles under faidy 
general assumptions. More specifical1y, if traded assets are sufficient1y productive 
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(Le., the aggregate endowment is bounded by a portfolio trading plan) then pric­
ing bubbles do not occur, regardless of the presence of sequentially incomplete 
markets, arbitrary borrowing limits and incomplete participation of householcls in 
the infinite sequence of spot markets. All these extensions of the basic theory may 
only be compatible with a pricing bubble in additional situations if the economy is 
not sufficiently productive, and as a result of these restrictions aggregate wealth 
is infinite-valued in the given equilibriurn. It should be remarked though that 
under sequentially incomplete markets the fundamental value of a given security 
may not be unambiguously defined, and even in very simple cases a bubble may 
be possible fol' some state-price processes. As shown in Theorem 3.3, however, 
this pathology ceases to exist if agents are sufficiently impatient. 
These results suggest that known examples of pricing bubbles depend upon 
rather special circurnstances. In consequence, familiar examples (such as the over­
lapping generations model of Samuelson (1958) or the Bewley (1980) model) seem 
to be quite fragile as potential foundations for monetary theory. For when these 
models are extended to allow for trading in additional assets that are sufficiently 
productive (in particular, capital earning returns satisfying the criterion of Abel 
et. al. Lor to include an infinitely lived household (01' Barro "dynasty") that is 
able to borro\\' against its future endowment and that owns a fraction of aggre­
gate wealth. pricing· bubbles -and hence monetary equilibria- can be excluded 
under quite general assumptions. We conclude from this that robust monetary 
equilibria depend upon the presence of additional trading restrictions. As shown 
in a companion papel' (Santos and Woodford (1995)), in such kind of models 
the fundamental value of an asset can be extended to include the shadow value 
of relaxation of the constraints, and in consequence monetary equilibl'ia are not 
usefully thought as pricing bubbles. 
Finally. we would like to emphasize that our results excluding the possibility 
of rational pricing bubbles do not imply that there should be no role for an effect 
of self-fulfilling expectations upon asset prices and equilibriurn allocations. While 
examples of multiple equilibria and "sunspots" equilibria are loosely referred to 
as "bubbles", there is generally no close analytical connection between these phe­
nomena and the existence of a pricing bubble in our sense. In particular, the 
presence of assets sufficient1y productive to ensure a finite value for the economy's 
aggregate endowment does not exclude the possibility that equilibriurn is inde­
terrninate, 01' that sunspot equilibria exist, as we discuss further in Santos and 
Woodford (1993). 
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7. Appendix 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.2: (1) We first establish that 1tz(st) ~ (iz(st), where 
(iz(st) =sup Vz(st;p, a). Let a be any elernent of A(st), and let z be any plan 
OEA(s') . 
satisfying conditions (2.6). Then it suffices to show that 
q(st)'z(i) ~ vz(i;p, a) (7.1) 
Multiplication of the left- and right-hand sides of (2.6a) by a(sr), and summing 
over srl sr-1 for sorne sr-1 yields 
a(sr-1)q(sr-1)'z(sr-1) ~ t a(sr)(p(sr)'x(sr) + q(sr)' z(sr)) 
s,,[s.. -1 
using (2.1). Repetition of this argument for each t + 1 :5 r :5 T and each srlst, 
for arbitrary T, and summing over a11 those nodes, yields 
T 
a(st)q(st)'z(st) ~ L L a(sr)p(sr)'x(sr) + L a(sT)q(sT)'z(sT) 
r=t+l sr¡s! ST;SI 
T 
> L L a(sr)p(sr)'x(sr) 
r=t+1 srlsl 
using (2.6b). As this bound holds for a11 T > t, and the right-hand side is a 
non-decreasing series in T, there must exist a we11-defined limit of the right-hand 
side as T- 00, and it must satisfy the sarne bound, so that (7.1) holds. 
(2) Kext we establish that 7i'z(st) :5 vz(st). This is only non-trivial if (iz(st) < 
+00, so we assume that this is the case. lt then suffices to exhibit a plan z 
satisfying conditions (2.6) such that 
(7.2) 
We construct such plan as fo11ows. For any srlst, consider the minirnization prob­
lem 
(7.3) 
such that R(sr+l )'z ~ y(sr+1) for each sr+llsr, where y is a specification ofrequired 
wealth y(sr+l) at each of the nodes sr+llsr. We establish below that for the case 
17(sr+l) = p(sr+1 )'x(sr+l) + vz(sr+l) 
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this problem has a solution provided that y(sr+l) = O for all sr+llsr such that 
R(sr+ 1) =O; moreover, the minimized value satisfies 
(7.4) 
Let z(sr) denote a portfolio at node sr that solves this problem. Then the plan z 
given by z(sr) = z(sr) for each srlst satisfies (2.6) at all nodes, and satisfies (7.2) 
as well. Thus (2.7a) is established. 
(3) It remains to establish the existence of a solution to (7.3) that satisfies (7.4). 
Let Z denote the set z E 'R,k(.") such that R(sr+l)'z 2: y(sr+l) for each sr+llsr . 
From the fact that R(sr+l) 2: Ofor each sr+l, it follows that we can increase or 
decrease each of the R(sr+l)'z to an arbitrary extent for each R(sr+l) :f: O by 
varying z. Hence Z is non-empty in the case that y( sr+1) =Ofor all sr+ 11 sr such 
that R(Sr+l) =O. Furthermore, there must exist a z such that R(sr+l)'Z ::; y(sr+l) 
for each sr+llsr. It follows that for any Z E Z, R('sr+l)'z 2: R(sr+l)'z for each 
sr+llsr. The absence of arbitrage opportunities then implies that q(sr),z 2: q(sr)'z 
for al! z E Z. Hence q(sr),z is a linear function of z, bounded below on the non­
ernpty convex polyhedral set Z. As such, it achieves its infirnurn at sorne point 
z E Z (Rockafellar, 1970, Corol1ary 27.3.2. p. 268). 
Furtherrnore, by the sarne argurnent as aboye, there plainly exists z E Z such 
that R(S"+I)'Z > y(S"+l) for each s"+lls" such that R(sr+l) > O. The Kuhn-Tucker 
theorem (Rockafellar, 1970, Corol!ary 28.3.1, p. 283) then implies the existence 
of a set of non-negative multipliers {5.(S"+I)} such that 
where m(s") is the number of successor states sr+llsr , and 
L(5., z) == q(s")'z - L 5.(sr+l )[R(sr+l )'z - y(s..+l)] (7.5) 
."+118" 
The first-order conditions for the minimization in (7.5) imply that 
q(s")' = L 5.(sr+l )R(Sr+l)' (7.6) 
8"+118" 
so that 5. is a set of non-negative state prices satisfying (2.1). Given that (7.6) 
halds at the optimum, the maximization part of (7.5) remains valid if the con­
straint that >. satisfies (7.6) is added as a further restriction of the domain over· 
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which one maximizes. Finally, by continuity, it remains valid if one adds the 
restriction that A» O, and replaces the maximum by a supremum. Thus 
(7.7) 
where A(sr) is the subset of AE n~~() for which (7.6) holds. 
We then observe that the maximization problem defining vz(st) implies, using 
a dynamic programming argument, that 
vz(sr) = L X(sr+l)y(sr+l) 
..-+1 ¡sr 
for each srll. Comparing this expression with (7.7) yields (7.4). This completes 
the proof of (2.7a). 
(4) Kext we establish (2.7b). The proofis similar to that in part (1). Consider 
any state-price process a E A(st), and any plan z satisfying conditions (i)-(ii) of 
the definition of .zr::Ast ). Multiplication ofboth sides of (2.5) by a(sr), and summing 
over all nodes srlst with dates t. + 1 ~ r ~ T, yields 
TL L a(sr)p(sr)'x(sr) ~ L a(sT)q(sT)'z(sT) - a(st)q(i)'z(i), 
r=t+l srls! sT ls ' 
using (2.1). But then the facts that q(sT)'Z(ST) ~ O for each sTlst, and that 
p(sr)'x(sr) ~ O for each srlst with r > T, imply that vx(st;p, a) ~ _q(st)' z(st). 
Then the definition of .zr::x(st) implies (2.7b). 
(5) Finally, we establish (2.7c) under the additional hypothesis. For this pur­
pose, we sho\\' that for arbitrary é > Oit is possible to construct a state-price 
process ii E A(st) such that vx(st;p, a) ~ .zr::x(st) + é. 
\Ve first observe that, if .zr.x(sr+l) < +00 for all sr+llsr,then 
.zr::x(sr) =~n L >.(sr+l)[p(sr+l)'x(sr+l) +.zr::x(sr+l)] (7.8) 
sr+ Ilsr 
where the minimization is over the set of non-negative multipliers >. satisfying 
(7.6). (The proof of (7.8) follows similar steps as that of part (3), and it is 
therefore omitted; for further details, see Santos and Woodford, 1993.) Then 
(7.8) holds at aH srlst under the additional hypothesis asserted in (2.7c), and the 
minimum is achieved for sorne set ofnon-negative multipliers {X(sr+llsr)}. Hence. 
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for every TI > t there exists a non-negative systern {l?(s"+ 11 s")}, where l?(s"l st) 
is defined recursively as l?(s"'st) = X(s")l?(s" - 1lst) and l?(st) = 1, such that 
TI 
1k(st) = L L l?(s~)p(s")'x(s") + L l?(STI )1k(sTI) (7.9) 
,,=t+1 s'"lsl .TI Isl 
Moreover, since a11 terrns ofthe forrnp(s")'x(s") andzAsTI) in (7.9) are finite, for 
every é > Othere exists a systern of state prices {a(s"lst)}, defined recursively as 
a(s"¡st) = A(S")a(s" - 1Ist), for positive {A(S")} E A(s" - 1) and a(st) = 1, such 
that 
é TI 
ZI:x(st) + 2 ~ L L a(s")p(s")'x(s") + L éi(sTI )1I:X (STI) 
,,=ot+ 1 sr Isl sTI Is
' 
By the sarn~ argument, for an arbitrary T2 > TI and ¡ > Oit fo11ows that there 
are state prices {a(srlsTI)} such that 
Proceeding inductively, we find that 
OC' 
1[:I'(st) + é ~ L L éi(sr)p(sr)'x(sr) 
,,=t+1 srlsl 
which implies that ZI:Ast) + é ~ V:r(st;p, a). This establishes (2.7c). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.3: (1) We shall show that there cannot be an 
optimal plan for household h if ZI:w,,(st) = +00 for sorne st E N h \ Ñh. This will 
establish that 1[w,,(st) < +00. Moreover, if 1[w,,(st) < +00 for each st E N h \ Ñh, 
then by Proposition 2.2 the bonowing lirnit Bh(st) can be equivalently expressed 
as 
inf vw,,(st;p,a) < +00 
GeA(s') 
(2) We first observe that for each st E N h \ Ñh at which ZI:w,,(st) = +00, there 
exists at least one irnrnediate successor st+l at which 1I:w"(St+l) = +00 as well. 
(For if there were none, (7.8) could be used to show that l[w,,(st) < +00.) For 
any such node st, let F( st) denote the set of immediate successors at which the 
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borrowing limit is similarly infinite. It is shown below that there also must exist 
a portfolio z(st) E 'R,k(,l) such that q(st)'z(st) < O, yet with the property that 
(7.10) 
for a11 St+l f/. F(st). 
Then no consumption/portfolio plan (ch , Zh) can be opti~al for h, since it is 
possible for h to consume a strictly greater vector at node st, without reducing 
consumption at any successor nodes of st, financing the additional consumption 
by purchasing a sufficient quantity of the portfolio z(st). This does not violate 
(l.lc), given that the borrowing limit is infinite at this node. As this portfolio 
change entails that R(st+l)'z(sr) 2:: Oat any successor node St+l f/. F(st), it is not 
necessary to change consumption or the portfolio at any such node. Furthermore, 
at any successor node st+l E F(st), the borrowing limit is again infinite. Thus 
one can proceed iteratively to construct an alternative portfolio plan that satisfies 
budget constraints (1.1) at a11 nodes, in the case of a consumption plan that differs 
from eh in the increased consumption at st, and possibly at sorne subsequent nodes. 
Since this alternative consumption plan must be preferred by (A.1), ch is evidently 
not optimal. 
(3) It remains to.show the existence of a portfolio z(st) that satisfies (7.10). 
From the definition of 2Iwh(St), it fol1ows that if 1!:wh(st) = +00 then there exists a 
sequence of finite portfolios {Zn}~=l' with the property that _q(st)'zn converges 
to +00, as n goes to 00, and _R(st+l)'zn :5 p(St+l)'Wh (st+l) + lIwh(St+l) for every 
n and evel'Y s'+1 </. F (s'). Con,idel' now the alternative ,equence { Iq(s~;' zn I}~~1 . 
q(st)'zn _R(St+l)' zn 
Then for e\'ery é > O, Iq(st)'znl = -1 and Iq(st)'znl $ é for a11 st+l tt. F(st) 
and large enough n. 
Let z = (1,1, ... ,1) be the portfolio involving one unit of each security. Let 
.\ > O be .ucb that q(s')'~ < 1. For n =1,2, ... , define zn = Cq(:';'znl + ~) . 
Then q(st)'zn < Ofor a11 n 2:: 1. Furthermore, by construction, R(st+l)'zn 2:: Ofor 
a11 St+l tt. F(st) and large enough n.• 
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